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LAW-MAKING TREATIES
LAV-MAKING TREATIES
By WVERNER LEvI*
T HE QUESTION whether treaties are sources of objective law,
i.e., law which is universally applicable to all members of the
family of nations, has long been a controversial one. No doubt, the
majority of writers on international law would answer the ques-
tion in the negative. Consensus of opinion exists only in regard to
the fact that treaties make law between the parties. Some writers
may object to calling the obligation arising out of treaties law,
but this would amount to an argument concerning terminology
rather than about the substance of the matter. It is not denied that
treaties set up rules to which the parties have to adhere and which
determine their conduct. This is the substance of law In so far
as treaties prescribe a rule of behavior or action which is formially
recognized as binding by the act of concluding the treaty, they
represent international law for the parties concerned. (Lex
contractus)3.
The strongest denial that treaties can ever be sources of uni-
versal,, objective law comes from Hall. He denies to treaties the
faculty of influencing third parties in any manner whatsoever,
treating them as strictly pacts between the parties. "The only
ground on which it is possible that treaties can be invested with
more authority than other national acts is that, when they embrace
a principle, they are supposed to express national opinion in a
peculiarly deliberate and solemn manner, and therefore to be of
more value than other precedents."
A less uncompromis7ing and more widespread opinion ascribes
to treaties the power to contribute indirectly to the formation of
objective rules of international law. This opinion holds that, when
a certain principle occurs repeatedly and identically in a number of
treaties, the principle may develop into a custom and thus be-
come an objective rule. Of course, the rule has then acquired its
*Dr. of Jurisprudence, Fribourg University, Switzerland. Member of
the teaching staff in the program of the Far Eastern Area and Language
Studies, University of Minnesota.
1Oppenheim, L.-Lauterpacht. H., International Law, 5th ed. London,
1937, vol. 1, p. 25, note 3, de Louter, J., Le Droit International Public
Positif, Oxford, 1920, p. 52.2Hall,. William E., A Treatise of International Law, 8th ed. Oxford,
1924, p. 8.
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character thanks to the law-making power of custom, the treaties
being evidence-of existing custom. But the sum total of the treaties
embodying the principle was responsible for the creation of cus-
tom, and thus each individual treaty had a significance transcending
the immediate interest of the parties.3
Another more recent view on the law-making power of treaties
has been expressed by a number of writers. They maintain that,
even if a rule occurs in a single treaty only and there is no evidence
of custom, the treaty may still have the effect of establishing a
universally valid rule of international law When a number of
first class nations regulate matters of permanent and general
interest and arrive at a settlement of a problem of international
character, such a settlement has great significance even for nations
not parties to it. If no large power promptly and effectively dis-
sents from it, such a settlement becomes universally accepted inter-
national law "within a moderate time" or after some time anyway I
No reason is given why the time element alone transforms a rule
binding only the parties to a treaty into one having the character
of objective law, binding upon all members of the family of nations.
If a rule stated only once becomes, under certain circumstances,
law after a certain time, it should become law as soon as it is
stated and the treaty concluded. Time alone has never been known
to cause a rule to become objective international law In the view
of the writers supporting this theory of the law-making power
of treaties, time should be important only in so far as it might
give non-signatory nations the opportunity to dissent from the
rule. For they, together with some others, 5 either state expressly or
imply that non-participants in the treaty have either expressly or
tacitly to subject themselves to the rule established by the treaty
in order to be bound by it. In other words, these writers adhere
to the old established principle that treaties can bind only those
who are parties to them. But then there is no need to single out
treaties regulating matters of permanent and general interest, etc.,
as these writers do, because there is no difference between these
and other treaties. Any treaty creates international, objective law
de Louter, op. cit., p. 53, Wheaton, Henry, Elements of International
Law, 2nd ed. Cambridge, 1910, part 1, p. 16; et al.
4Pollock, Sir Frederick, quoted in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Inter-
national Law, Washington, 1940, vol. 1. p. 19; de Visscher, Fernand, "La
Question des Isles d'Aland," Revue de Droit Intcrnational et de Legislation
Comiparee, series 3, vol. 2, 1921, p. 262.
5Wright, Quincy, "Conflicts between International Law and Treaties,"
American Journal of International Law, 1917, vol. 11, p. 573, Phillimore.
,Robert, Commentaries upon International Law, London, 1857, vol. 3, p. 664.
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between those who adhere to it. These writers apparently realize
the desirability of giving certain rules and certain conventions the
force of objective lawv. They apparently also realize that in prac-
tice certain rules and conventions do obtain the force of objective
law, and they attempt to reconcile theory with practice wvith that
Jack-of-all-trades the legal fiction of tacit consent.
At an earlier time there was no such reluctance to affirm, in
accordance with experience, that certain treaties have the power to
create objective rules of law, which may thus bind nations not
parties to the treaty.6 It was not stated exactly what kind of
treaties or rules were involved. In a general way they were said to
be concerned with certain abstract principles or certain general
international affairs. They are essentially the same type of treaties
described by the group of more recent authors just mentioned.
This brief survey of opinions on the law-making power of
treaties shows that really two questions are involved. One is what
rules embodied in a treaty are susceptible of becoming objective
rules of international law; the other is under what circumstances
does a rule, susceptible of becoming an objective rule of law, which
is embodied in a treaty, acquire the character of an objective rule
of law " I
In an attempt to answer the first question, treaties have been
classified with respect to the rules they embody into three main
groups. These are. 1. treaties regulating only specific interests of
the parties, interests which are of a restricted, or particular, or
local character; 2. those which deal with an existing principle or
rule of general interest and determine sud rule or principle in a
form binding upon the parties, and 3. those which resolve an
existing problem of law or which declare or establish new law.-
The greatest drawback of this grouping is that it presupposes
what is to be proved. It takes for granted the knowledge as to
which treaty contains a potential objective rule of international
law, instead' of supplying a criterion by which such knowledge may
be acquired. Besides, the grouping is rather indistinct and opens
possibilities of unending discussion.
6Bluntschli, E. C., Das inoderne Voelkerrecht, Noerdlingen, 1878, p. 5;
Pradier-Fod~r6 (Fioii) Traiti de Droit International Public, Parts, 1907,
vol. 1, p. 82; cf. Calvo, Charles, Le Droit Inteniational, Parts, 1896, vol. 1,
p. 160.
7de Louter, op. cit., p. 53, Finch, George A., Sources of Modern Inter-
national Law, Washington, 1937, p. 62; Moeller, Axel, InIcniatonal La,
part 1, London. 1931, p. 60; Despagnet, F., Droit Interualional Public, Parts,
1894, p. 64.
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Under the leadership of Bergbohms the German and Italian
school created a classification which appears to lead to commend-
able results. These schools distinguish between "rechtsgeschaeft-
lichen" and "rechtssetzenden" treaties. The "rechtsgeschaeftliche"
treaty would correspond to the contract in municipal law, the
"rechtssetzende" treaty would be equivalent to an act of the legis-
lature. The criterion by which the two groups of treaties may be
recognized is the direction of the will of the parties. In the first
group the will of each party has a different direction, a mutual
exchange of goods or services is desired, opposed or incongruent
interests are to be satisfied (for instance the buyer wants the
goods, the seller the money) In the second group the will of each
party has an identical direction, a common interest is to be
satisfied.' If the objection is raised10 that this distinction is till-
tenable because in any kind of contract the wills of the parties
have the same direction-the parties want the contract as a
whole, each does not want the oblization of the other-it mav be
answered that, if it seems more satisfactory, a slightly different
distinction may he made. Each of the parties wants the treaty (or
contract) In so far their desires are identical in the case of all
treaties. But the identity of wills ceases in regard to the obliga-
tion each wants the other to take on. There are two possibilities
either the obligation of etch would be the same, in which case
identity of wills would continue beyond the common desire to
conclude the treaty, or the obligation of each party would be
different, in which case the identity of wills ceases. If the obliga-
tion is not the same for each of them, the treaty cannot be said to
contain a potential objective rule of international law It is a char-
acteristic of such a rule that it should apply among those subjected
to it and that it should create the same right or burden for all.
Non-identical obligations do not possess the character of a legal
norin, and the treaty from which they emanate cannot be a po-
tential objective law-making treaty For instance a treaty for the
purchase of land obliges one party to deliver the land and the other
party to deliver the purchase price. The obligations are not identi-
cal, and the treaty does not contain a rule which could develop
SBergbohm, C.. Staasvertraege und Geset-e als Quellen des l'oelker-
rechts. Dorpat. 1877, p. 79.
9Heilborn, Paul. Grundbegriffe des Voelkerrechis, Stuttgart, 1912 p.
40 and the review of the teachings of the German and Italian schools there.
1OKaufmann, Erich, Das Wesen des Voelkerrechts und die clausla rebus
sic stantibus, Tuebingen, 1911, p. 160, Gihl, Torsten, International Legts-
lation, Oxford, 1937, p. 49.
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into objective law. The Geneva convention of 1864 for the amneliora-
- tion of the condition of the wounded in war creates identical ob-
ligations for all and contains therefore a potential objective rule
of international law 11
A more obvious and more easily applied criterion for the dif-
ferentiation of law-making and other treaties would be a con-
sideration of the result desired by the parties, which is, of course,
a corollary of the wills of the parties. In the "rechtsgeschaeftlichen"
group of treaties, each party expects a different final result from
the fulfillment of the treaty. In the second group, the parties
expect an identical result. The final objective to be reached by the
treaty is identical for all participants. Their obligation from the
treaty affects them all alike. This again is the characteristic of an
objective rule of law and therefor only this second group of
treaties can be potentially law-making.
A further mark of distinction by which potential law-making
treaties and other treaties may be differentiated is the permanence
of the obligation. It is a characteristic of a law that it continues
to exist until abolished. An obligation which ceases to exist after
fulfillment cannot be a potential rule of objective law. A law
cannot be exhausted by fulfilling it no matter how often. An ob-
ligation can be, but need not always be, exhausted after it has
been fulfilled. This criterion is of only limited use, however. It
can be said that treaties creating obligations which cease after ful-
fillment cannot be law-making treaties. Treaties creating obliga-
tions which continue to exist after one or more fulfillments may be
potential law-making treaties.
By thus applying the characteristic differences between lex
contractus and general law to treaties, it is possible to establish
two categories of treaties. One category embodies rules which
have the characteristics of the general law, the other embodies
rules which have the characteristics of the lex contractus.
After it has been established that a given treaty is potentially
a law-making treaty, the question whether it actually does make
objective law has then to be answered. Those authors who hold
that a treaty is never capable of making law binding upon non-
l1In order to demonstrate the impracticability of this distinction, Gill,
op. cit., p. 50, gives as an example a treaty guaranteeing the most favored
nation clause. While this example is directed at Triepel's theory of tile
Gemeinwille and its consequences, it is pertinent here too. Gihli's question, is
this a law-making treaty or not, has to be answered in the affirnative. The
obligation to apply equally favored treatment to other nations could be
stipulated for any nation- and the principle of the most favored nation is
therefore a potential objective rule of international law.
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signatories-and the overwhelming majority of authors have that
opinion-can go no further than to find out whether a treaty
belongs into the law-making category They will then have to
apply their legal fiction of the tacit consent of those nations to
whom they wish to apply the law established by the treaty, and
will have to prove such consent. But there is another school of
thought according to which potential 'law-making treaties actually
do make objective law under certain circumstanres. 12 The idea
that no nation can be bound against its will is given up. The rigid
concept of the sovereignty of nations in international law is sur-
rendered. While this development began long before the second
World War, it will be stimulated considerably by the prevailing
tendency to restrict national sovereignty in favor of some supra-
national organization. This school maintains that a potential law-
making treaty does create objective law if three conditions are
fulfilled. There must be several partners to the treaty, a great
principle of general international interest must be involved, and
the parties must want the principle to be generally binding.
In the Aland Case the convention in question was signed by
only three powers (although the convention was later attached
to a treaty signed by a greater number of nations) and it appears
that the first condition, that there must be several partners to the
treaty, means more than two partners. But whatever the opinion
of the arbitrators in the case may have been, the condition seems
arbitrary The number of partners to the treaty should be irrele-
vant. The requirement has apparently been made to give an index
of the extent of interest in the principle embodied in the treaty
If several powers are concerned with the same treaty the likeli-
hood that a principle of general interest is involved is greater
than if only two powers settle an affair between themselves. The
purpose of this requirement was to prevent a treaty regulating
the subjective interests of the parties only from being considered
a law-making treaty The need for it disappears if one subscribes
to the distinction between the two categories Qf treaties already
discussed. For in that case the fact that treaties which regulate
non-identical-subjective-interests cannot be law-making treaties,
12Bluntschli, op. cit., Pradier-Fod6re, op. cit., McNair, Arnold, "The
Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties," British Year Book
of International Law, 1930, vol. 11, p. 112, The Aland Islands case in
League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 3, October,
1920, p. 17 Cf. against the Aland Island case de Visseher, op. cit., Udina,
Manlio, "La succession des etats quant aux obligations autres que les dettes
publiques," Academie de Droit International, Recucil des Cours, vol. 44,
1935-I1, p. 713.
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by definition, eliminates the necessity of proving the potential
general interest by the number of parties to the treaty. 3
Whether the principle involved is of general international in-
terest is a question of fact. It has to be decided according to cir-
cuistances. The history of the principle to be settled has to be
taken into consideration. The political conditions which led to the
conclusion of the treaty have to be examined. The effect of the
principle upon nations other than the signatories has to be
gauged.
The third condition, which must be fulfilled to give a treaty
law-making power is the will of the parties to make the principle
involved binding upon all members of the family of nations. This
will is usually present if the preliminary question, whether the
principle is of general international interest, can be answered in
the affirmative. It is just to take the will of the parties into
account. They create the treaty and therewith the basis for the
legal validity of the rule. If it were claimed that their will can
have no influence upon whether a rule is to be objective law or
not, then there is no limit to what a treaty may result 'in and,
indeed, it could be argued that the treaty itself might exist
without the parties' will. The effect of a treaty cannot go beyond
what the signatories wanted it to be, if that be within the limits
of legal possibilities.
As-has been mentioned, one result of this theory of the law-
making power of treaties- would be that a small number of nations
could obligate all of the remaining states. This would be contrary
to the principle that no nation can be bound against its will or
without its consent. However, quite apart from the tendency to
disregard this principle, oi at least to minimize its effect, it has
never been consistently applied in practice. Customary law may
be applied to a state although that state may actually object to
it. If only those rules were valid in international law to which
there was unanimous consent there would be no mternational
law.14 Besides, the fact that a limited number of states can bind
l13The arbitrators in the Aland case do not make the distinction. It is
probably for that reason that they seem to insist on several parties to tile
treaty in order to give that treaty law-makIng power. For in the same re-
port the arbitrators stated that although the principle of the self-determina-
tion of peoples is of general and great political importance it has not been
embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations and its consecration in
a number of mutual (I) treaties would not turn it into a universal objective
rule of international law. League of Nations, op. cit., p. 5.
14Cf. de Martens, G. F., Pr~cms du droit des gens moderne de 'Europe,
Goettingen, 1789, part 1, p. 3.
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all the members of the family of nations is not objectionable in
itself. The condition that the rule must be of general interest
is a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary action by a few states.
On the other hand, general interest means interest on the part
of most states, not all states. The opposition of some nations- to
the rule to be established as objective law still makes the existence
of general international interest possible. Without here going into
the problem of majority rule in international law, it may be said,
in addition to what has been said on the subject above, that it is
a phenomenon in municipal law and human society generally that
unanimity of interests cannot always be obtained. Some interests
have to be subordinated to others. This very fact is the origin of
law It has to be taken into account in international law as well
as everywhere else. If there were no clashes of interest there would
be no necessity for law The rule of unanimity in decisions of an
international character, never rigidly adhered to in practice, has
done as much harm as, if not more harm than, good in important
international affairs.
Far from encouraging arbitrary action by some nations, the
adoption of this theory of the law-making power of treaties would
actually diminish the- possibility of such action. The result of
the establishment of an objective rule by treaty is to give this
rule a life of its own. It becomes detached from its basis, the
treaty" The individual action of the signatory states or other
states could not abolish the rule. It could be changed only in ac-
cordance with the general principles of international law concern-
ing the establishment of new rules, or the change of old rules, of
international law Whatever may happen to the original treaty or
the relation between the treaty partners or the partners them-
selves, the rule once established continues to exist as objective
international law The beneficial effect of this would be an in-
crease in the permanence and stability of rules of general interest
in international relations. Altogether this theory seems to be in
accord with the aims and general principles of international law
It also supplies a solid foundation for existing practice. For these
reasons, the adoption of the theory as a principle of international
law should be welcomed.
15The Aland Island case, League of Nations, op. cit.
